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build(deps): bump pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #4
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build(deps): bump pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #4
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Bumps [pip](https://github.com/pypa/pip) from 23.2.1 to 23.3. - [Changelog](https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/main/NEWS.rst) - [Commits](pypa/pip@23.2.1...23.3) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: pip dependency-type: direct:production ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <[email protected]>
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…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
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Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint [ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ] AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning: [ 196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! [ 196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec [ 196.159970] drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid [ 196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4 [ 196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023 [ 196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work [ 196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c [ 196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000 [ 196.160495] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.160504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 196.160520] PKRU: 55555554 [ 196.160526] Call Trace: [ 196.160532] <TASK> [ 196.160548] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 [ 196.160570] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160580] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 [ 196.160600] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160613] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 [ 196.160637] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 [ 196.160658] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 [ 196.160675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 [ 196.160709] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160727] __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0 [ 196.160746] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160765] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160778] ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270 [ 196.160806] schedule+0x68/0x110 [ 196.160820] schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160 [ 196.160829] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160842] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160855] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90 [ 196.160878] __down_common+0xff/0x220 [ 196.160905] __down_timeout+0x16/0x30 [ 196.160920] down_timeout+0x64/0x70 [ 196.160938] acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200 [ 196.160959] acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280 [ 196.160979] acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0 [ 196.160992] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0 [ 196.161005] acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490 [ 196.161018] ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0 [ 196.161038] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0 [ 196.161055] ? kfree+0x79/0x120 [ 196.161071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161089] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161110] get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70 [ 196.161127] ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161146] __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0 [ 196.161166] class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160 [ 196.161184] ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161203] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161223] power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70 [ 196.161243] amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161276] amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161310] amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161340] notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0 [ 196.161362] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60 [ 196.161378] power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110 [ 196.161394] process_one_work+0x178/0x360 [ 196.161412] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161424] worker_thread+0x307/0x430 [ 196.161440] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161451] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 196.161467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161486] ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70 [ 196.161502] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161518] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 196.161558] </TASK> [ 196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the constraint. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Allen Zhong <[email protected]> Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571 Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sj-aws
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint [ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ] AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning: [ 196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! [ 196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec [ 196.159970] drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid [ 196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4 [ 196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023 [ 196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work [ 196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c [ 196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000 [ 196.160495] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.160504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 196.160520] PKRU: 55555554 [ 196.160526] Call Trace: [ 196.160532] <TASK> [ 196.160548] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 [ 196.160570] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160580] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 [ 196.160600] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160613] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 [ 196.160637] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 [ 196.160658] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 [ 196.160675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 [ 196.160709] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160727] __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0 [ 196.160746] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160765] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160778] ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270 [ 196.160806] schedule+0x68/0x110 [ 196.160820] schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160 [ 196.160829] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160842] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160855] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90 [ 196.160878] __down_common+0xff/0x220 [ 196.160905] __down_timeout+0x16/0x30 [ 196.160920] down_timeout+0x64/0x70 [ 196.160938] acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200 [ 196.160959] acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280 [ 196.160979] acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0 [ 196.160992] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0 [ 196.161005] acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490 [ 196.161018] ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0 [ 196.161038] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0 [ 196.161055] ? kfree+0x79/0x120 [ 196.161071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161089] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161110] get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70 [ 196.161127] ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161146] __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0 [ 196.161166] class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160 [ 196.161184] ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161203] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161223] power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70 [ 196.161243] amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161276] amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161310] amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161340] notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0 [ 196.161362] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60 [ 196.161378] power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110 [ 196.161394] process_one_work+0x178/0x360 [ 196.161412] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161424] worker_thread+0x307/0x430 [ 196.161440] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161451] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 196.161467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161486] ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70 [ 196.161502] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161518] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 196.161558] </TASK> [ 196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the constraint. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Allen Zhong <[email protected]> Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571 Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sj-aws
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint [ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ] AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning: [ 196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! [ 196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec [ 196.159970] drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid [ 196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4 [ 196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023 [ 196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work [ 196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c [ 196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000 [ 196.160495] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.160504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 196.160520] PKRU: 55555554 [ 196.160526] Call Trace: [ 196.160532] <TASK> [ 196.160548] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 [ 196.160570] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160580] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 [ 196.160600] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160613] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 [ 196.160637] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 [ 196.160658] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 [ 196.160675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 [ 196.160709] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560 [ 196.160727] __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0 [ 196.160746] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160765] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160778] ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270 [ 196.160806] schedule+0x68/0x110 [ 196.160820] schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160 [ 196.160829] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160842] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.160855] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90 [ 196.160878] __down_common+0xff/0x220 [ 196.160905] __down_timeout+0x16/0x30 [ 196.160920] down_timeout+0x64/0x70 [ 196.160938] acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200 [ 196.160959] acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280 [ 196.160979] acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0 [ 196.160992] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0 [ 196.161005] acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490 [ 196.161018] ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0 [ 196.161038] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0 [ 196.161055] ? kfree+0x79/0x120 [ 196.161071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161089] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161110] get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70 [ 196.161127] ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161146] __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0 [ 196.161166] class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160 [ 196.161184] ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80 [ 196.161203] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 196.161223] power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70 [ 196.161243] amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161276] amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161310] amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf] [ 196.161340] notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0 [ 196.161362] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60 [ 196.161378] power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110 [ 196.161394] process_one_work+0x178/0x360 [ 196.161412] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161424] worker_thread+0x307/0x430 [ 196.161440] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161451] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 196.161467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161486] ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70 [ 196.161502] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 196.161518] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 196.161558] </TASK> [ 196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the constraint. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Allen Zhong <[email protected]> Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571 Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
puranjaymohan
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Nov 10, 2023
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws
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Nov 16, 2023
When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():
1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):
virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested
2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:
virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}
If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.
Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
lan9303_mdio_read
_regmap_read
regmap_read
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
mdio_probe
really_probe
__driver_probe_device
driver_probe_device
__device_attach_driver
bus_for_each_drv
__device_attach
device_initial_probe
bus_probe_device
deferred_probe_work_func
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire.part.0
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
regmap_lock_mutex
regmap_read
lan9303_phy_read
dsa_slave_phy_read
__mdiobus_read
mdiobus_read
get_phy_device
mdiobus_scan
__mdiobus_register
dsa_register_switch
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
mdio_probe
really_probe
__driver_probe_device
driver_probe_device
__device_attach_driver
bus_for_each_drv
__device_attach
device_initial_probe
bus_probe_device
deferred_probe_work_func
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
#0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
#3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
#4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace
show_stack
dump_stack_lvl
dump_stack
print_circular_bug
check_noncircular
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire.part.0
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
regmap_lock_mutex
regmap_read
lan9303_phy_read
dsa_slave_phy_read
__mdiobus_read
mdiobus_read
get_phy_device
mdiobus_scan
__mdiobus_register
dsa_register_switch
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
...
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 gregkh#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 gregkh#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 gregkh#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 gregkh#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 gregkh#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 gregkh#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 gregkh#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 gregkh#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 gregkh#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 gregkh#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: He Kuang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 gregkh#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 gregkh#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 gregkh#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 gregkh#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 gregkh#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 gregkh#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 gregkh#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 gregkh#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 gregkh#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 gregkh#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: He Kuang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sj-aws
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Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mngyadam
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Nov 27, 2023
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
abuehaze14
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Nov 28, 2023
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws
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Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
sj-aws
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Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
sj-aws
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commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
sj-aws
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commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…f-times'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times
This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:
static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
{
ctx->i = 0;
return 0;
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
{
struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };
bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
}
This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.
The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch gregkh#6 is the main part of the series;
- patch gregkh#7 adds test cases for gregkh#6;
- patch gregkh#8 extend patch gregkh#6 with same speculative scalar widening
logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch gregkh#9 adds test cases for gregkh#8;
- patch gregkh#10 extends patch gregkh#6 to track maximal number of callback
executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch gregkh#11 adds test cases for gregkh#10.
Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
------------------------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o benchmark 1 2 +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 322 407 +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 113 151 +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 341 291 -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 344 301 -43 (-12.50%)
Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.
Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
- validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch gregkh#10;
- renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
- fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
- callback_result_precise;
- parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
- parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
- renamings (suggested by Alexei):
- s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
- s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
- s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
- prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
for callsite;
- test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
value check instead of verifier log message checks
(suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
- small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
- callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
- R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
- log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
iteration depth messages;
- __no_msg macro removed;
- bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
- commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[2] [email protected]:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
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commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Nov 29, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
paniakin-aws
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Nov 29, 2023
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws
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Dec 3, 2023
When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
q2ven
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Dec 5, 2023
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws
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Dec 8, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream. When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
sj-aws
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Dec 8, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream. When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
shaoyingxu
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Nov 24, 2025
[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ecb9a84 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811cb96b50 by task kworker/u17:4/352 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 352 Comm: kworker/u17:4 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g717368f83676 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci13 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10b/0x170 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x191/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc4/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_connect_cfm+0xb4/0xae0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1441 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2082 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x20a/0x2e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1313 hci_conn_unlink+0x55f/0x810 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1121 hci_conn_del+0xb6/0x1110 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1147 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x8c5/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x281/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x77e/0x1040 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0xbee/0x1200 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c7/0x870 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 31370: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4382 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x22f/0x390 mm/slub.c:4394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xae/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2239 sk_alloc+0x34/0x5a0 net/core/sock.c:2295 bt_sock_alloc+0x3c/0x330 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:151 sco_sock_alloc net/bluetooth/sco.c:562 [inline] sco_sock_create+0xc0/0x350 net/bluetooth/sco.c:593 bt_sock_create+0x161/0x3b0 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:135 __sock_create+0x3ad/0x780 net/socket.c:1589 sock_create net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1684 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd5/0x330 net/socket.c:1731 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1745 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1743 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1743 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 31374: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x3d/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline] kfree+0x199/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4900 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2278 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4aa/0x630 net/core/sock.c:2373 sco_sock_release+0x2ad/0x300 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1333 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_close+0xb8/0x230 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3d1/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x206/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:227 get_signal+0x1201/0x1410 kernel/signal.c:2807 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x740 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x68/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:40 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1dd/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
yifei-aws
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Dec 2, 2025
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
shaoyingxu
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Dec 3, 2025
[ Upstream commit a91c809 ] The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> [ replaced disable_delayed_work_sync() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ecb9a84 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811cb96b50 by task kworker/u17:4/352 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 352 Comm: kworker/u17:4 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g717368f83676 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci13 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10b/0x170 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x191/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc4/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_connect_cfm+0xb4/0xae0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1441 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2082 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x20a/0x2e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1313 hci_conn_unlink+0x55f/0x810 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1121 hci_conn_del+0xb6/0x1110 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1147 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x8c5/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x281/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x77e/0x1040 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0xbee/0x1200 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c7/0x870 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 31370: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4382 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x22f/0x390 mm/slub.c:4394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xae/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2239 sk_alloc+0x34/0x5a0 net/core/sock.c:2295 bt_sock_alloc+0x3c/0x330 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:151 sco_sock_alloc net/bluetooth/sco.c:562 [inline] sco_sock_create+0xc0/0x350 net/bluetooth/sco.c:593 bt_sock_create+0x161/0x3b0 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:135 __sock_create+0x3ad/0x780 net/socket.c:1589 sock_create net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1684 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd5/0x330 net/socket.c:1731 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1745 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1743 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1743 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 31374: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x3d/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline] kfree+0x199/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4900 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2278 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4aa/0x630 net/core/sock.c:2373 sco_sock_release+0x2ad/0x300 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1333 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_close+0xb8/0x230 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3d1/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x206/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:227 get_signal+0x1201/0x1410 kernel/signal.c:2807 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x740 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x68/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:40 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1dd/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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The cpuidle governor callbacks for update, select and reflect
are always running on the actual idle entering/exiting CPU, so
use the more optimized this_cpu_ptr() to access the internal teo
data.
This brings down the latency-critical teo_reflect() from
static void teo_reflect(struct cpuidle_device *dev, int state)
{
ffffffc080ffcff0: hint #0x19
ffffffc080ffcff4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-48]!
struct teo_cpu *cpu_data = per_cpu_ptr(&teo_cpus, dev->cpu);
ffffffc080ffcff8: adrp x2, ffffffc0848c0000 <gicv5_global_data+0x28>
{
ffffffc080ffcffc: add x29, sp, #0x0
ffffffc080ffd000: stp x19, x20, [sp, gregkh#16]
ffffffc080ffd004: orr x20, xzr, x0
struct teo_cpu *cpu_data = per_cpu_ptr(&teo_cpus, dev->cpu);
ffffffc080ffd008: add x0, x2, #0xc20
{
ffffffc080ffd00c: stp x21, x22, [sp, #32]
struct teo_cpu *cpu_data = per_cpu_ptr(&teo_cpus, dev->cpu);
ffffffc080ffd010: adrp x19, ffffffc083eb5000 <cpu_devices+0x78>
ffffffc080ffd014: add x19, x19, #0xbb0
ffffffc080ffd018: ldr w3, [x20, #4]
dev->last_state_idx = state;
to
static void teo_reflect(struct cpuidle_device *dev, int state)
{
ffffffc080ffd034: hint #0x19
ffffffc080ffd038: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-48]!
ffffffc080ffd03c: add x29, sp, #0x0
ffffffc080ffd040: stp x19, x20, [sp, gregkh#16]
ffffffc080ffd044: orr x20, xzr, x0
struct teo_cpu *cpu_data = this_cpu_ptr(&teo_cpus);
ffffffc080ffd048: adrp x19, ffffffc083eb5000 <cpu_devices+0x78>
{
ffffffc080ffd04c: stp x21, x22, [sp, #32]
struct teo_cpu *cpu_data = this_cpu_ptr(&teo_cpus);
ffffffc080ffd050: add x19, x19, #0xbb0
dev->last_state_idx = state;
This saves us:
adrp x2, ffffffc0848c0000 <gicv5_global_data+0x28>
add x0, x2, #0xc20
ldr w3, [x20, #4]
Signed-off-by: Christian Loehle <[email protected]>
[ rjw: Subject tweak ]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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The xfstests' test-case generic/101 leaves HFS+ volume in corrupted state: sudo ./check generic/101 FSTYP -- hfsplus PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.17.0-rc1+ #4 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Oct 1 15:02:44 PDT 2025 MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch generic/101 _check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/loop51 is inconsistent (see XFSTESTS-2/xfstests-dev/results//generic/101.full for details) Ran: generic/101 Failures: generic/101 Failed 1 of 1 tests sudo fsck.hfsplus -d /dev/loop51 ** /dev/loop51 Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K. Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux). ** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume. The volume name is untitled ** Checking extents overflow file. ** Checking catalog file. ** Checking multi-linked files. ** Checking catalog hierarchy. ** Checking extended attributes file. ** Checking volume bitmap. ** Checking volume information. Invalid volume free block count (It should be 2614350 instead of 2614382) Verify Status: VIStat = 0x8000, ABTStat = 0x0000 EBTStat = 0x0000 CBTStat = 0x0000 CatStat = 0x00000000 ** Repairing volume. ** Rechecking volume. ** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume. The volume name is untitled ** Checking extents overflow file. ** Checking catalog file. ** Checking multi-linked files. ** Checking catalog hierarchy. ** Checking extended attributes file. ** Checking volume bitmap. ** Checking volume information. ** The volume untitled was repaired successfully. This test executes such steps: "Test that if we truncate a file to a smaller size, then truncate it to its original size or a larger size, then fsyncing it and a power failure happens, the file will have the range [first_truncate_size, last_size[ with all bytes having a value of 0x00 if we read it the next time the filesystem is mounted.". HFS+ keeps volume's free block count in the superblock. However, hfsplus_file_fsync() doesn't store superblock's content. As a result, superblock contains not correct value of free blocks if a power failure happens. This patch adds functionality of saving superblock's content during hfsplus_file_fsync() call. sudo ./check generic/101 FSTYP -- hfsplus PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.18.0-rc3+ #96 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Nov 19 12:47:37 PST 2025 MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch generic/101 32s ... 30s Ran: generic/101 Passed all 1 tests sudo fsck.hfsplus -d /dev/loop51 ** /dev/loop51 Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K. Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux). ** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume. The volume name is untitled ** Checking extents overflow file. ** Checking catalog file. ** Checking multi-linked files. ** Checking catalog hierarchy. ** Checking extended attributes file. ** Checking volume bitmap. ** Checking volume information. ** The volume untitled appears to be OK. Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]> cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <[email protected]> cc: Yangtao Li <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]>
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Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> says: Similarly to how CAN FD reuses the bittiming logic of Classical CAN, CAN XL also reuses the entirety of CAN FD features, and, on top of that, adds new features which are specific to CAN XL. A so-called 'mixed-mode' is intended to have (XL-tolerant) CAN FD nodes and CAN XL nodes on one CAN segment, where the FD-controllers can talk CC/FD and the XL-controllers can talk CC/FD/XL. This mixed-mode utilizes the known error-signalling (ES) for sending CC/FD/XL frames. For CAN FD and CAN XL the tranceiver delay compensation (TDC) is supported to use common CAN and CAN-SIG transceivers. The CANXL-only mode disables the error-signalling in the CAN XL controller. This mode does not allow CC/FD frames to be sent but additionally offers a CAN XL transceiver mode switching (TMS) to send CAN XL frames with up to 20Mbit/s data rate. The TMS utilizes a PWM configuration which is added to the netlink interface. Configured with CAN_CTRLMODE_FD and CAN_CTRLMODE_XL this leads to: FD=0 XL=0 CC-only mode (ES=1) FD=1 XL=0 FD/CC mixed-mode (ES=1) FD=1 XL=1 XL/FD/CC mixed-mode (ES=1) FD=0 XL=1 XL-only mode (ES=0, TMS optional) Patch #1 print defined ctrlmode strings capitalized to increase the readability and to be in line with the 'ip' tool (iproute2). Patch #2 is a small clean-up which makes can_calc_bittiming() use NL_SET_ERR_MSG() instead of netdev_err(). Patch #3 adds a check in can_dev_dropped_skb() to drop CAN FD frames when CAN FD is turned off. Patch #4 adds CAN_CTRLMODE_RESTRICTED. Note that contrary to the other CAN_CTRL_MODE_XL_* that are introduced in the later patches, this control mode is not specific to CAN XL. The nuance is that because this restricted mode was only added in ISO 11898-1:2024, it is made mandatory for CAN XL devices but optional for other protocols. This is why this patch is added as a preparation before introducing the core CAN XL logic. Patch #5 adds all the CAN XL features which are inherited from CAN FD: the nominal bittiming, the data bittiming and the TDC. Patch gregkh#6 add a new CAN_CTRLMODE_XL_TMS control mode which is specific to CAN XL to enable the transceiver mode switching (TMS) in XL-only mode. Patch gregkh#7 adds a check in can_dev_dropped_skb() to drop CAN CC/FD frames when the CAN XL controller is in CAN XL-only mode. The introduced can_dev_in_xl_only_mode() function also determines the error-signalling configuration for the CAN XL controllers. Patch gregkh#8 to gregkh#11 add the PWM logic for the CAN XL TMS mode. Patch gregkh#12 to gregkh#14 add different default sample-points for standard CAN and CAN SIG transceivers (with TDC) and CAN XL transceivers using PWM in the CAN XL TMS mode. Patch gregkh#15 add a dummy_can driver for netlink testing and debugging. Patch gregkh#16 check CAN frame type (CC/FD/XL) when writing those frames to the CAN_RAW socket and reject them if it's not supported by the CAN interface. Patch gregkh#17 increase the resolution when printing the bitrate error and round-up the value to 0.01% in the case the resolution would still provide values which would lead to 0.00%. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
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…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
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[ Upstream commit a91c809 ] The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> [ replaced disable_delayed_work_sync() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ecb9a84 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811cb96b50 by task kworker/u17:4/352 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 352 Comm: kworker/u17:4 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g717368f83676 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci13 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10b/0x170 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x191/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc4/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_connect_cfm+0xb4/0xae0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1441 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2082 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x20a/0x2e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1313 hci_conn_unlink+0x55f/0x810 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1121 hci_conn_del+0xb6/0x1110 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1147 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x8c5/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x281/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x77e/0x1040 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0xbee/0x1200 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c7/0x870 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 31370: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4382 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x22f/0x390 mm/slub.c:4394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xae/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2239 sk_alloc+0x34/0x5a0 net/core/sock.c:2295 bt_sock_alloc+0x3c/0x330 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:151 sco_sock_alloc net/bluetooth/sco.c:562 [inline] sco_sock_create+0xc0/0x350 net/bluetooth/sco.c:593 bt_sock_create+0x161/0x3b0 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:135 __sock_create+0x3ad/0x780 net/socket.c:1589 sock_create net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1684 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd5/0x330 net/socket.c:1731 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1745 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1743 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1743 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 31374: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x3d/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline] kfree+0x199/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4900 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2278 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4aa/0x630 net/core/sock.c:2373 sco_sock_release+0x2ad/0x300 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1333 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_close+0xb8/0x230 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3d1/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x206/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:227 get_signal+0x1201/0x1410 kernel/signal.c:2807 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x740 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x68/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:40 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1dd/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…ockdep While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this: [T79] ====================================================== [T79] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [T79] 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ #1 Tainted: G OE [T79] ------------------------------------------------------ [T79] kworker/2:0/79 is trying to acquire lock: [T79] ffff88801f968278 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] but task is already holding lock: [T79] ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] which lock already depends on the new lock. [T79] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [T79] -> #1 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}: [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] __mutex_lock+0x1af/0x1c10 [T79] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [T79] cma_get_port+0xba/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_bind_addr+0x107/0x320 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_resolve_addr+0xa3/0x830 [rdma_cm] [T79] destroy_lease_table+0x12b/0x420 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix+0x3e/0x80 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_posix_acl+0x6e9/0xab0 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_v4_ntacl+0x53/0x870 [ksmbd] [T79] __sys_connect_file+0x131/0x1c0 [T79] __sys_connect+0x111/0x140 [T79] __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xc0 [T79] x64_sys_call+0xe7d/0x26a0 [T79] do_syscall_64+0x93/0xff0 [T79] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [T79] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}: [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 [T79] kthread+0x3ec/0x8b0 [T79] ret_from_fork+0x314/0x400 [T79] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [T79] other info that might help us debug this: [T79] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [T79] CPU0 CPU1 [T79] ---- ---- [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] *** DEADLOCK *** [T79] 5 locks held by kworker/2:0/79: [T79] #0: ffff88800120b158 ((wq_completion)events_long){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xfca/0x1930 [T79] #1: ffffc9000474fd00 ((work_completion)(&ctrl->ctrl_work)) {+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x804/0x1930 [T79] #2: ffffffffc11307d0 (ctrl_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: server_ctrl_handle_work+0x21/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] #3: ffffffffc11347b0 (init_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x18/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] #4: ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] stack backtrace: [T79] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: kworker/2:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [T79] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [T79] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [T79] Workqueue: events_long server_ctrl_handle_work [ksmbd] ... [T79] print_circular_bug+0xfd/0x130 [T79] check_noncircular+0x150/0x170 [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? apparmor_socket_post_create+0x180/0x700 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0 [T79] ? __pfx_siw_create_listen+0x10/0x10 [siw] [T79] ? trace_preempt_on+0x4c/0x130 [T79] ? __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x90 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? preempt_count_sub+0x52/0x80 [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x60 [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? rdma_restrack_add+0x12c/0x630 [ib_core] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? cma_get_port+0x30d/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ? __pfx_ksmbd_rdma_init+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? register_netdevice_notifier+0x1dc/0x240 [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? assign_work+0x16f/0x280 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 I was not able to reproduce this as I was testing with various runs switching siw and rxe as well as IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT sockets, while the above stack used siw with the non IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT patches [1]. Even if this patch doesn't solve the above I think it's a good idea to reclassify the sockets used by siw, I also send patches for rxe to reclassify, as well as my IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT socket patches [1] will do it, this should minimize potential false positives. [1] https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect Cc: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Acked-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
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It's possible that the auxiliary proxy device we add when setting up the
GPIO controller exposing shared pins, will get matched and probed
immediately. The gpio-proxy-driver will then retrieve the shared
descriptor structure. That will cause a recursive mutex locking and
a deadlock because we're already holding the gpio_shared_lock in
gpio_device_setup_shared() and try to take it again in
devm_gpiod_shared_get() like this:
[ 4.298346] gpiolib_shared: GPIO 130 owned by f100000.pinctrl is shared by multiple consumers
[ 4.307157] gpiolib_shared: Setting up a shared GPIO entry for speaker@0,3
[ 4.314604]
[ 4.316146] ============================================
[ 4.321600] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 4.327054] 6.18.0-rc7-next-20251125-g3f300d0674f6-dirty #3887 Not tainted
[ 4.334115] --------------------------------------------
[ 4.339566] kworker/u32:3/71 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 4.344931] ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: devm_gpiod_shared_get+0x34/0x2e0
[ 4.354057]
[ 4.354057] but task is already holding lock:
[ 4.360041] ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gpio_device_setup_shared+0x30/0x268
[ 4.369421]
[ 4.369421] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 4.376126] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 4.376126]
[ 4.382198] CPU0
[ 4.384711] ----
[ 4.387223] lock(gpio_shared_lock);
[ 4.390992] lock(gpio_shared_lock);
[ 4.394761]
[ 4.394761] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 4.394761]
[ 4.400832] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 4.400832]
[ 4.407802] 5 locks held by kworker/u32:3/71:
[ 4.412279] #0: ffff000080020948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x194/0x64c
[ 4.422650] #1: ffff800080963d60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x64c
[ 4.432117] #2: ffff00008165c8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x3c/0x198
[ 4.440700] #3: ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gpio_device_setup_shared+0x30/0x268
[ 4.450523] #4: ffff0000810fe918 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x3c/0x198
[ 4.459103]
[ 4.459103] stack backtrace:
[ 4.463581] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/u32:3 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-next-20251125-g3f300d0674f6-dirty #3887 PREEMPT
[ 4.463589] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
[ 4.463593] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 4.463602] Call trace:
[ 4.463604] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
[ 4.463617] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98
[ 4.463627] dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 4.463636] print_deadlock_bug+0x224/0x238
[ 4.463643] __lock_acquire+0xe4c/0x15f0
[ 4.463648] lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x344
[ 4.463653] __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x840
[ 4.463661] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
[ 4.463667] devm_gpiod_shared_get+0x34/0x2e0
[ 4.463674] gpio_shared_proxy_probe+0x18/0x138
[ 4.463682] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x40/0x78
[ 4.463688] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0
[ 4.463694] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120
[ 4.463701] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160
[ 4.463708] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x140
[ 4.463716] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 4.463723] __device_attach+0xa0/0x198
[ 4.463729] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 4.463737] bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc0
[ 4.463743] device_add+0x578/0x76c
[ 4.463747] __auxiliary_device_add+0x40/0xac
[ 4.463752] gpio_device_setup_shared+0x1f8/0x268
[ 4.463758] gpiochip_add_data_with_key+0xdac/0x10ac
[ 4.463763] devm_gpiochip_add_data_with_key+0x30/0x80
[ 4.463768] msm_pinctrl_probe+0x4b0/0x5e0
[ 4.463779] sm8250_pinctrl_probe+0x18/0x40
[ 4.463784] platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4
[ 4.463793] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0
[ 4.463800] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120
[ 4.463807] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160
[ 4.463814] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x140
[ 4.463821] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 4.463827] __device_attach+0xa0/0x198
[ 4.463834] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 4.463841] bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc0
[ 4.463847] deferred_probe_work_func+0x90/0xcc
[ 4.463854] process_one_work+0x214/0x64c
[ 4.463860] worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360
[ 4.463866] kthread+0x14c/0x220
[ 4.463871] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 77.265041] random: crng init done
Fortunately, at the time of creating of the auxiliary device, we already
know the correct entry so let's store it as the device's platform data.
We don't need to hold gpio_shared_lock in devm_gpiod_shared_get() as
we're not removing the entry or traversing the list anymore but we still
need to protect it from concurrent modification of its fields so add a
more fine-grained mutex.
Fixes: a060b8c ("gpiolib: implement low-level, shared GPIO support")
Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/fimuvblfy2cmn7o4wzcxjzrux5mwhvlvyxfsgeqs6ore2xg75i@ax46d3sfmdux/
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ecb9a84 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811cb96b50 by task kworker/u17:4/352 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 352 Comm: kworker/u17:4 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g717368f83676 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci13 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10b/0x170 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x191/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc4/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_connect_cfm+0xb4/0xae0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1441 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2082 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x20a/0x2e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1313 hci_conn_unlink+0x55f/0x810 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1121 hci_conn_del+0xb6/0x1110 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1147 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x8c5/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x281/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x77e/0x1040 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0xbee/0x1200 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c7/0x870 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 31370: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4382 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x22f/0x390 mm/slub.c:4394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xae/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2239 sk_alloc+0x34/0x5a0 net/core/sock.c:2295 bt_sock_alloc+0x3c/0x330 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:151 sco_sock_alloc net/bluetooth/sco.c:562 [inline] sco_sock_create+0xc0/0x350 net/bluetooth/sco.c:593 bt_sock_create+0x161/0x3b0 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:135 __sock_create+0x3ad/0x780 net/socket.c:1589 sock_create net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1684 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd5/0x330 net/socket.c:1731 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1745 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1743 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1743 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 31374: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x3d/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline] kfree+0x199/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4900 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2278 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4aa/0x630 net/core/sock.c:2373 sco_sock_release+0x2ad/0x300 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1333 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_close+0xb8/0x230 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3d1/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x206/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:227 get_signal+0x1201/0x1410 kernel/signal.c:2807 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x740 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x68/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:40 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1dd/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 9d274c1 upstream. We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 gregkh#6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) gregkh#6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) gregkh#7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) gregkh#8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) gregkh#9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) gregkh#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) gregkh#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) gregkh#12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) gregkh#13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) gregkh#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) gregkh#15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) gregkh#16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Dec 7, 2025
[ Upstream commit ecb9a84 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811cb96b50 by task kworker/u17:4/352 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 352 Comm: kworker/u17:4 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g717368f83676 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci13 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10b/0x170 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x191/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc4/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sco_conn_free net/bluetooth/sco.c:87 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0xdd/0x410 net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_connect_cfm+0xb4/0xae0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1441 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2082 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x20a/0x2e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1313 hci_conn_unlink+0x55f/0x810 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1121 hci_conn_del+0xb6/0x1110 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1147 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x8c5/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x281/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x77e/0x1040 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0xbee/0x1200 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c7/0x870 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 31370: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4382 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x22f/0x390 mm/slub.c:4394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xae/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2239 sk_alloc+0x34/0x5a0 net/core/sock.c:2295 bt_sock_alloc+0x3c/0x330 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:151 sco_sock_alloc net/bluetooth/sco.c:562 [inline] sco_sock_create+0xc0/0x350 net/bluetooth/sco.c:593 bt_sock_create+0x161/0x3b0 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:135 __sock_create+0x3ad/0x780 net/socket.c:1589 sock_create net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1684 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd5/0x330 net/socket.c:1731 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1745 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1743 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1743 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 31374: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x3d/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline] kfree+0x199/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4900 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2278 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4aa/0x630 net/core/sock.c:2373 sco_sock_release+0x2ad/0x300 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1333 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_close+0xb8/0x230 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3d1/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x206/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:227 get_signal+0x1201/0x1410 kernel/signal.c:2807 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x740 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x68/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:40 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1dd/0x240 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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… 'T'
When perf report with annotation for a symbol, press 's' and 'T', then exit
the annotate browser. Once annotate the same symbol, the annotate browser
will crash.
The browser.arch was required to be correctly updated when data type
feature was enabled by 'T'. Usually it was initialized by symbol__annotate2
function. If a symbol has already been correctly annotated at the first
time, it should not call the symbol__annotate2 function again, thus the
browser.arch will not get initialized. Then at the second time to show the
annotate browser, the data type needs to be displayed but the browser.arch
is empty.
Stack trace as below:
Perf: Segmentation fault
-------- backtrace --------
#0 0x55d365 in ui__signal_backtrace setup.c:0
#1 0x7f5ff1a3e930 in __restore_rt libc.so.6[3e930]
#2 0x570f08 in arch__is perf[570f08]
#3 0x562186 in annotate_get_insn_location perf[562186]
#4 0x562626 in __hist_entry__get_data_type annotate.c:0
#5 0x56476d in annotation_line__write perf[56476d]
gregkh#6 0x54e2db in annotate_browser__write annotate.c:0
gregkh#7 0x54d061 in ui_browser__list_head_refresh perf[54d061]
gregkh#8 0x54dc9e in annotate_browser__refresh annotate.c:0
gregkh#9 0x54c03d in __ui_browser__refresh browser.c:0
gregkh#10 0x54ccf8 in ui_browser__run perf[54ccf8]
gregkh#11 0x54eb92 in __hist_entry__tui_annotate perf[54eb92]
gregkh#12 0x552293 in do_annotate hists.c:0
gregkh#13 0x55941c in evsel__hists_browse hists.c:0
gregkh#14 0x55b00f in evlist__tui_browse_hists perf[55b00f]
gregkh#15 0x42ff02 in cmd_report perf[42ff02]
gregkh#16 0x494008 in run_builtin perf.c:0
gregkh#17 0x494305 in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
gregkh#18 0x410547 in main perf[410547]
gregkh#19 0x7f5ff1a295d0 in __libc_start_call_main libc.so.6[295d0]
gregkh#20 0x7f5ff1a29680 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc.so.6[29680]
gregkh#21 0x410b75 in _start perf[410b75]
Fixes: 1d4374a ("perf annotate: Add 'T' hot key to toggle data type display")
Reviewed-by: James Clark <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tianyou Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:
perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
Error:
cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
perf: Segmentation fault
#0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0
The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.
To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.
Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
paniakin-aws
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Dec 8, 2025
When interrupting perf stat in repeat mode with a signal the signal is passed to the child process but the repeat doesn't terminate: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run #1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run #2 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt [ perf stat: executing run #3 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run #4 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run #5 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#6 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#7 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#8 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#9 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#10 ... ] Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.9500 +- 0.0512 seconds time elapsed ( +- 5.39% ) 0.01user 0.02system 0:09.53elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 18940maxresident)k 29944inputs+0outputs (0major+2629minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Terminate the repeated run and give a reasonable exit value: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run #1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run #2 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run #3 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.680 +- 0.321 seconds time elapsed ( +- 47.16% ) Command exited with non-zero status 130 0.00user 0.01system 0:02.05elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 70688maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+5002minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Note, this also changes the exit value for non-repeat runs when interrupted by a signal. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws
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Dec 10, 2025
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
mngyadam
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…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
mngyadam
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Dec 10, 2025
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
yifei-aws
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Dec 10, 2025
…oles on aarch64 offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out. However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling offline_pages() when offlining a memory block. We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a memory hole: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 Call trace: memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250 device_offline+0x154/0x1d8 online_store+0xa4/0x118 dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78 sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0 new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8 vfs_write+0x718/0xc88 ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8 do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0_sync+0x178/0x180 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846 Memory Limit: none If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged memory that doesn't have any holes. So call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws
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Dec 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
paniakin-aws
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[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
paniakin-aws
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 18, 2025
[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Bumps pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3.
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e3dc91dBump for release3e85558Update AUTHORS.txt8d02787Reclassify news fragmentf6ecf40Merge pull request #12350 from sbidoul/readact-collecting-url3060865Merge pull request #12335 from edmorley/patch-18f0ed32Redact URLs in Collecting... logsd1659b8Correct issue number for NEWS entry added by #121972333ef3Upgrade urllib3 to 1.26.17 (#12343)496b268Update "Running Tests" documentation (#12334)d1f0981Merge pull request #12331 from sbidoul/update-egg-deprecation-messageDependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting
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